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GATT and NAFTA Provisions on Intel-
lectual Propertyt
Emery Simon*
Today I will talk about three or four different issues. One
answers the question: why are we having conferences like this?
When I started doing intellectual property at the Office of the Unit-
ed States Trade Representative ("USTR") seven or eight years ago,
there weren't any meetings like this to go to. I think that this kind
of conference reflects an evolution that has occurred.
I will also talk a little bit about two of the principal agreements
that the United States has been negotiating from our perspective
and at least one that I think we have come close to concluding. I
will then give you some of my impressions about where I think
some of these issues are going domestically and maybe internation-
ally as well.
Why are we doing all of this? Why would somebody like me,
who used to be a trade negotiator, be involved in intellectual prop-
erty? The answer to that is quite straightforward-it's kind of
crude too: money. The United States is a big exporter of intellec-
tual property. Analyses of the U.S. economy going back to the
1950s demonstrate that we are principally good at producing know-
how and being creative and innovative. In the early to mid-1980s,
there was a convergence of events that made us think a little more
aggressively about how we in the United States protect the value
of our intellectual property in the trade context.
Interestingly enough, the Europeans-being the copycats that
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they are-figured out that it was in their interest too. Dr. Jean-
Frangois Verstrynge decided to develop his program, and now there
are trade policy instruments, and they're copying section 301 [of
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("OTCA")],1
and they're doing bilaterals with the Eastern Europeans. But that's
the kind of stuff that we want people to rip off. That was a good
idea and good ideas always get imitated.
The convergence of four different events happened in the mid-
1980s. First, technology changed. It became much easier to steal
intellectual property through the advent of videocassette recorders,
audiocassette recorders-now digital technologies-and personal
computers. In the trademark area, with color photocopiers and a
little off-set printing, you can duplicate somebody's trademark no
matter how fancy and fanciful with very little effort. In the patent
area or in the chemical area, someone with a bachelor's degree in
chemistry and a small lab can take apart an agricultural chemical,
figure out what its chemical composition is, and go into business
making it-never having spent a penny doing the research and
development of the product. So technology posed a new threat,
which was that the innovative and creative things that we were
producing became much more vulnerable.
Second, the global economy became smaller. Many U.S. com-
panies that produce intellectual property-European and Japanese
companies as well-began to operate on a global scale. They be-
came much more aware of the fact that it wasn't enough to sue the
guy in Dayton, Ohio who was ripping off your patent, or to go
after the street vendors on Fifth Avenue-who are still there; but
that it was just as important to become aggressive with countries
outside of the United States, particularly, in the early days, Pacific
Rim countries like Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea. Later I will say
a little bit more about developing countries and their role in all of
this.
As companies operated on a global scale, information became
disseminated on a global scale. For example, guys in Bangkok
1. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 301, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242, 2411, 2420 (1988)) [hereinafter OTCA].
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stole Bruce Springsteen's latest album that was selling like hot-
cakes. They didn't steal the latest fusion jazz release. They stole
the stuff that was successful; they knew what was successful. At
one point during the late 1980s, because of videocassette technolo-
gy, one of the problems that we had was that you could sometimes
buy on the streets of Hong Kong or somewhere in Taiwan movies
on videocassette that were just being first run in movie theaters in
New York. It became almost instantaneous that the pirates found
a good product and were ripping it off-very frequently before it
ever was really disseminated, even in our own market.
Third, the mentality of a lot of people in corporate positions
changed-at least it's my impression that there was a change.
Traditionally, U.S. business people have viewed their intellectual
property lawyers as kind of nerds-green eyeshade-type people
who sat somewhere in the bowels of the legal department-and
they didn't pay a lot of attention to their intellectual property.
At some point, some corporations began to realize two things,
One was that intellectual property was just as much a part of their
bundle of assets as their factory, as their equipment, as their ma-
chinery, as any other asset that they had. It was an intangible
asset, but it was very much an asset. Just as they wouldn't sit still
for somebody walking in and taking their typewriters, they became
much more sensitive to people walking out with their intellectual
property.
Two was that intellectual property really is a profit center be-
cause of licensing. For example, if you can figure out some way
to get a factory in Brussels, which is now ripping off your patent,
to continue manufacturing the product, but to do it under license
and pay royalties for it, you can turn what is now a deadly loss to
you-you are losing market because it's displacing your
sales-into something that is profitable.
Fourth, there was a high level of frustration with the existing
international institutions that dealt with intellectual property issues.
I was talking to a conference participant last night about how tradi-
tionally in intellectual property, organizations like the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization ("WIPO") deal with-and I mean this
in the right way-relatively low-level government officials. It is
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very unusual for a minister or cabinet officer to become involved
with a WIPO deliberation, and the process in WIPO wasn't at all
politicized.
Furthermore, the modernization of international intellectual
property laws through existing institutions occurred at a snail's
pace, largely because governments could not deliver the political
will to actually follow through on things. It occurred at a snail's
pace because you have a very strong, determined person running
WIPO, [Director-General] Dr. Arpad Bogsch, and there was an
enormous amount of deference for Dr. Bogsch to set the pace, the
agenda, and the direction where all this was going.
As the business community became more aggressive, as the
threats of piracy became larger, and as technology evolved, entirely
new challenges were posed-and we are now having a new set of
challenges with digital technology. There was a strong sense of
frustration that international law was not evolving rapidly enough.
Another element was enforcement. It is not enough to have a
good law on the books; you also have to be able to put somebody
in jail, you have to be able to enforce the law, you have to be able
to litigate, and you have to be able to get an effective result in the
end which acts as a deterrent to further infringement.
Somebody mentioned this morning that the Berne Convention,
like the Paris Convention, has a dispute settlement mechanism
which provides that if you don't live up to your obligations, you
can be taken to the International Court of Justice. In the hundred
and four, five, six-however many years-of the Berne Conven-
tion, that never happened. Therefore, one of the other things that
we wanted to do at the USTR was to create obligations for coun-
tries to perform better enforcement-to actually send out prosecu-
tors and law enforcement officials and put the people who were
violating the law out of business.
Then suddenly there was pent-up demand, in economic terms,
for these new, better, more aggressive, and more modem intellec-
tual property laws domestically and globally. The intellectual prop-
erty community had pursued enforcement, but when it said to the
Brazilians, "If you don't protect our software, we're not going to
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let your software come to the United States," the Brazilians smiled
and said, "Sounds like a good deal to us." The electronics commu-
nity then said, "We've got to somehow rebalance the field." How
do we rebalance the field? We cross-pollinate the disciplines of
intellectual property and trade, and we use trade as leverage. Now
we go back to Brazil and we say, "Protect our software." The
Brazilians say, "Eh?" And we say, "We'll stop your coffee ex-
ports, we'll stop your sugar exports, we'll stop your exports of
rubber footwear." Suddenly, there's something to save, creating an
entirely different dynamic.
In the mid-1980s, the United States started making good intel-
lectual property protection a precondition, in a sense, for certain
kinds of trade preferences and the avoiding of certain kinds of
trade paying. Actually, the United States started much earlier than
that-although not in a very relevant way-in 1974 when Congress
adopted the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974,2
which is famous (or infamous) because of its emigration provisions
and the granting of preferential trade status based upon whether or
not the centrally planned economies permitted emigration. Back
then, three of the ten criteria for granting trade preferences were
intellectual property criteria: countries had to have patent laws,
copyright laws, and trademark laws. However, we never enforced
those criteria.
In 1983, the first precondition was enacted by Congress under
a President Reagan initiative called the Caribbean Basin Initiative.3
Then a change in law occurred in the Generalized System of Pref-
erences Renewal Act of 19844 which permitted the President to
grant duty-free access to the U.S. market. The law evolved
through the 1988 Amendments to the Trade Act of 1974, by creat-
ing section 3015 which is a specific intellectual property-tailored
2. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 402, 88 Stat. 2056 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1988)).
3. Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat.
369 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1988)).
4. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465
(1988)).
5. OTCA, supra note 1.
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provision. Section 301 contains the unfair competition provision
of the U.S. trade law.6 The law was altered to create a specific
cause of action regarding intellectual property.7
The domestic constituencies of the U.S. program evolved in two
different directions. On the one hand, we became very active bilat-
erally. We had negotiations with Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and Ar-
gentina. A whole bunch of bilateral negotiations were aimed spe-
cifically at resolving issues. Some were more successful than oth-
ers; an agreement that we negotiated with South Korea in 1986 got
them to improve their laws. Interestingly enough, that agreement
was three-and-a-half pages long.9 The Intellectual Property Chapter
of the NAFTA is twenty-eight pages long.10 There's been a certain
evolution here.
On the other hand, the bilateral program has produced any
number of results. The U.S. Register of Copyrights, Ralph Oman,
spoke earlier about how Dr. Arpad Bogsch was still nodding in the
direction of the Japanese rental rights for sound recordings. The
reason why the Japanese changed their rental rights for sound re-
cordings and provided us even with one year of exclusivity was
because we threatened them with trade sanctions. The reason why
the Eastern Europeans-I guess they're now called Central Europe-
ans, aren't they? Having been born in Central Europe, I should
know this-reformed their intellectual property laws is that they all
wanted trade agreements with the United States and preferential
access to the U.S. market. We made it a precondition that those
agreements contained a chapter on intellectual property. Some
worked better than others. Some countries have lived up to their
obligations. One country in particular has not.
Thus, the bilateral program was very aggressive. At this point
6. Id. § 182, 19 U.S.C. § 2242.
7. Id. § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
8. Adequacy of Korean Laws for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 50
Fed. Reg. 45,883 (Off. U.S. Trade Rep. 1985) (initiation of investigation), 51 Fed. Reg.
29,445 (Presidential Memorandum 1986) (terminating investigation).
9. See Korean Copyright Law No. 3916, Dec. 31, 1986 (effective July 1, 1987).
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Extra File, NAFTA.
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we-I shouldn't say "we" anymore since I don't work for the gov-
ernment any longer-the United States has negotiated something in
excess of forty or forty-five bilateral agreements. I was fortunate
enough to be involved in the vast majority of these; they were an
interesting experience.
What were the U.S. objectives in establishing these kinds of
programs? We were trying to ensure that there was still an incen-
tive for innovation both domestically and internationally. We were
trying to maintain U.S. competitiveness, and we felt that U.S. com-
petitiveness was largely based on technology, know-how, and cre-
ativity. We were trying to diminish piracy. We were trying to
make sure that when you invested $30 million in developing a new
pharmaceutical, that you actually got to make some money having
made that investment. Finally, we wanted to make sure that coun-
tries lived up to their obligations, which is one of the reasons why
we inserted dispute settlement mechanisms and provisions on en-
forcement in most of the bilateral agreements.
The NAFTA and the GATT1 are really a combination of this
history that I have been briefly sketching out. We have learned a
lot over the years. I mentioned that the Korean agreement was
three or four pages long; we have since become much more de-
tailed and much more specific. There are many new issues that we
have included.
There is, however, a problem with these bilateral agreements as
well. The problem is that in a strange kind of way these agree-
ments are frozen in time. When we started negotiating these agree-
ments aggressively in the mid-1980s, there were certain problems
that were on the horizon. Rental rights for software and sound
recordings and motion picture were an issue. The patentability of
all kinds of subject matter was a problem. Protection for well-
known marks was a problem. Enforcement was a problem too,
such as the unavailability of access to courts and border enforce-
ment.
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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However, we didn't know anything about digital technologies.
We didn't know anything about theft of encrypted satellite signals.
We didn't know anything about biotechnology-or very little about
biotechnology. A lot of elements have evolved in the last two or
three years. In fact-and these are the things that make working
in this area both fun and frustrating-no matter how well you do
at trying to codify an international law or what you think is the
solution to the problem at hand, because of, what a friend of mine
calls, in international negotiations the "meshing of great bureaucra-
cies" (I think it's more the gnashing of great bureaucracies), by the
time those bureaucracies come together, it has taken so long that
the technology has passed you by.
Thus, one of the flaws in the way these agreements are con-
structed is not that what's in them is not good-I think it is good,
and I think what is in them solves a lot of problems-but that they
are incomplete solutions and they are solutions that do not reach
every possible consequence. It only takes imagination to come up
with a new way to defeat the legal protection of intellectual proper-
ty.
One of the reasons why there has been so much discussion of
national treatment in this forum is that national treatment is not
only an important concept, but it's an important economic and
trade issue-not because of what's going on today, but because of
what's going to go on five years from now. If the European Com-
munity applies a rule of reciprocity, which is basically that access
to money that goes into a pool depends upon reciprocity, five years
from now everything will be in that pool. Five years from now
you won't go to a video store to rent a video; you'll get it on-line.
You won't go to a record store to buy a record; you'll get that on-
line. You won't buy a book at a bookstore; you'll get that on-line.
You will pay a monthly fee to the service provider. The service
provider collects all the money and then everybody will have to go
to him and say, "I want my share." If you permit a rule of reci-
procity to apply, you won't be able to get your money.
That's what it's all about, in my mind. It's not so much about
whether the French get to keep twenty-five cents off the top for
culture or you get to keep seventy-five cents off the top because
[Vol. 4:171
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they've figured out two new creative ways to beat the system. And
it's not about the pool of money that is out there right now because
the money available right now in Europe for all of this is in the
tens of millions of dollars, and it's going to grow into billions of
dollars very quickly. If you permit the rule of reciprocity to apply,
what you're going to get is an enormously diminished number of
products that are going to be available to people, and you're going
to get an enormously diminished global market. So much for the
aside.
I'll talk about the GATT first because NAFTA is really an
improvement on the GATT; in computer software terms, its se-
quence, structure, and organization are very much like the GATT.
The GATT essentially has three components: standards, enforce-
ment and basic principles.
The GATT agreement starts out with basic principles. It dis-
cusses concepts like national treatment and MFN (most-favored-
nation). Then it basically builds on existing international law,
primarily the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention. They
used to call this a "Conventions-Plus" approach. I've always hated
that term, but it is descriptive of what you get, which is that we
were trying to improve upon what was in the treaties rather than
diminishing the treaties.
For example, in the copyright area, the Berne Convention does-
n't state specific standards for protection of computer programs.
Although people argue that it does implicitly, we felt it was impor-
tant to have an explicit statement. In the patent area, the Paris
Convention provides very short terms of protection; we felt that the
term of protection should be longer. It provides for very permissi-
ble compulsory licensing; we felt that needed to be improved. It
provides for exclusions from patentability for almost any category
of product that you want; we felt that needed improvement. Thus,
we tried to build on those conventions.
Enforcement under the GATT basically requires signatories to
have within their national regimes the availability of remedies both
in the domestic courts and at the border. That may sound simple,
but it's not. First, many of the countries do not have border en-
forcement. Second, even those countries that do have domestic
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enforcement often have weird, quirky enforcement. I'll give you
one of my favorite examples. The U.S. motion picture and record-
ing industries have a big piracy problem in Thailand. In Thailand,
vendors manufacture audiovisual tapes at night; the police cannot
run a raid at night, but only during the day. All of the manufactur-
ing is done at night, and all of the distribution is done at night.
Although all of the sales are done during the day, enforcement
requires tracking down each individual vendor, which is not very
efficient.
I don't know why I'm picking on Thailand, but another key
issue is that if you're in Thailand to prosecute, for example, a
street vendor for having pirated a movie, and it's a Jack Nicholson
movie, Jack has to show up and say, "My movie, my performance,
it's my right that's being violated." The Thai courts won't accept
an affidavit, so Jack has to show up in Bangkok and sit there, wait
three or four days-weeks, a month-while the courts gets around
to hearing the case. Jack must walk in and says "Yup, that's me
in that picture. Yup, that's my movie. Yup, I'm hurt." Obvious-
ly, this is a very inefficient way to try to do enforcement. Some
of the GATT agreement goes after some of those issues; it makes
it easier to litigate the cases.
Some of these enforcement issues are going to have to do less
with law and more with-how does one say this diplomatical-
ly?-more with baksheesh, more with the level of corruption that
exists in some of these systems. In one particular South American
country where I spent a lot of time in the last few years, if you
want the police to run a raid, and if you didn't want the guy who
was going to be raided to find out about it so he could get rid of
the evidence, you would have to make it worth the police's while.
It becomes very problematic, but you can deal with those kinds of
things. Sometimes you like them better; sometimes you like them
less. Therefore, it was important to get the concept of enforceabili-
ty in the GATT agreement.
The GATT is basically a good agreement, however, it's lacking
in a number of elements. I'm not an apologist for the GATT pro-
posal on intellectual property. It is not complete or perfect, but it
is an enormous step forward because it has brought the standards
(Vol. 4:171
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for protection up to much higher levels, has made standards for
enforcement, and has implemented them in the trade environment.
I know Register Oman and others would agree with this; I don't
think Dr. Bogsch and others would be doing half of what they're
doing with the WIPO right now but for the challenge posed by the
fact that any sovereign government can go through any forum it
wants for negotiating on intellectual property. A government is not
wedded to the WIPO just because it's called the "World Intellectu-
al Property Organization." That's what being a sovereign govern-
ment is all about. So I really think that the challenge posed to
WIPO has energized that institution for the better.
There are some specific issues that U.S. industry would like to
have improved about the GATT agreement. One is the national
treatment issue, which really is a bilateral confrontation between
the U.S. and the European Community which manifests itself in the
GATT, in WIPO, and which will manifest itself probably in a very
ugly bilateral confrontation before being resolved, largely because
there's nothing in it for the EC. There's no reason why the EC
should give the United States the benefit of national treatment in
the area of copyright. We are major exporters, we import virtually
nothing, the balance of trade is entirely in our favor, and they don't
like it; I understand that. The EC is good at exporting some
things. What we should do is try to figure out some ways to help
those industries. That's the difference.
There are two flaws in the GATT agreement, as I see it. First,
it is limited to the rights specifically enumerated in the Agreement.
The national treatment and MFN obligations of the Agreement are
limited to what is within the four comers of the Agreement. I see
this as a major problem because the world is evolving too fast. If
we were smarter, we would make an Agreement that is more ex-
pansive.
The second flaw with the Agreement, as I see it, is that al-
though we always talk about the GATT setting floors and setting
minima, the problem is: what are the minimum and the maximum
levels of protection? That is something that is in the eyes of the
beholder. There is no way to cure that particular problem. There
is no way to reset these standards. But we need to be aware of the
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fact that, over time, we are going to have to have some jurispru-
dence-through the GATT panel and other mechanisms-which
will clarify some of those issues.
One should not be under a misconception that once we get an
agreement like this and sign it and put it down, we are now done.
We're going to have to tinker with it both through legislation-i.e.,
redrafting the Agreement-and through having some GATT panel
decisions.
NAFTA cures one of those two major problems. NAFTA basi-
cally says that the parties to the Agreement must provide protection
on a national treatment basis for 'all intellectual property rights.
NAFTA doesn't say, "those enumerated in this Agreement" and it
doesn't say, "those that we have thought about today." It says all
intellectual property rights. I think that cures one major flaw in the
proposed GATT agreement.
However, there's just no way to make GATT less prone to
change over time through friction rather than amicable discussion.
That's one of the realities that one has to accept when dealing with
international agreements.
My guess is that the GATT agreement will be done this year,
largely because everybody is exhausted, everybody is bored with
it, and nobody wants to spend any more political capital on it.
We were talking about political capital earlier. One of the
differences between NAFTA and GATT-and one of the reasons
why we were able to negotiate NAFTA in fourteen months-was
that'NAFTA was among three countries instead of 108 countries.
A second, and I think a somewhat more fundamental reason for the
quick negotiation of NAFTA as compared to GATT, was that there
was full, highest level political commitment for NAFTA. President
Bush, Prime Minister Mulroney, and President Salinas were fully
committed in every possible way. I'll tell you that as a negotiator,
it's a hell of a lot easier to negotiate a deal when you know your
President wants it than when you're trying to negotiate a deal that
the President doesn't really know about, doesn't know whether he
wants or doesn't want it, or hasn't really focused on it. (I can say
those kinds of things, now too.)
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That's an enormous difference between NAFTA and GATT.
Ultimately, I think the reason why the GATT agreement will be
concluded this year in all its aspects is that I think that the political
will is now involved in it-not so much because people really want
it, but because the costs associated with this thing continuing to
fester are getting a little too high and it's distracting people a little
too much. (Personally, I don't have to worry about it anymore. I
don't have to go to Geneva anymore. So I don't really care wheth-
er we conclude it this year or not, but I think we will.)
NAFTA requires a certain number of changes in U.S. law. The
USTR identified about ten or twelve of them, most of which were
trivial. Some involve changes in our customs regulations.
Two major legislative changes are required by NAFTA. For
the patent lawyers, one of those legislative changes is going to do
away with or alter section 104 of the Patent Act. 2 Somebody
earlier was talking about "our quirky little patent law." The United
States is not a first-to-file country, but a first-to-invent country.
We have a first-to-invent patent system where you get into an in-
terference practice and you actually fight about who really was the
first to invent. Under the U.S. law, evidence of foreign invention
activity is not admissible. 3 However, NAFTA provides that, at
least for Mexico and Canada, inventive activity in those countries
shall be admissible in a U.S. court for interference litigation.
Frankly, I don't see that as a major problem. I know some of
the patent lawyers are a little worked up about it. Interference
litigators are very worked up about it. But I think there is broad
support in the Congress for it.
The second issue is really a much more complicated issue and
will take much longer than the time I have left to talk about.
When the United States joined the Berne Convention on March 1,
1989, we ducked on a couple of issues. One of the issues that we
12. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).
13. "In proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office and in the courts, an appli-
cant for a patent, or a patentee, may not establish a date of invention by reference to
knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with respect thereto, in a foreign country ..
.." Id.
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ducked on was retroactivity: do we provide protection for works
that still are protected in their country of origin?
One of our obligations under the NAFFA-although we wrote
the provision in a very vague kind of way-is to establish copy-
right protection for Mexican and Canadian motion pictures. This
is limited to motion pictures which are still protected in those
countries under copyright. The Europeans, among others, are anx-
ious to have us apply such protection to them as well. The United
States has a strong interest in it because when we negotiate with
the Chinese, for example, to enact a new copyright law, we want
them to provide protection for all of our classic works.
The reason why it's a very complicated issue is that there is a
whole series of rather convoluted constitutional issues involved:
is it an uncompensated taking? 14 If it's a taking, who compen-
sates? the U.S. treasury? the individual? Our Constitution also
talks about intellectual property protection for limited terms.15 We
are now re-establishing protection. We need to somehow deal with
that constitutional issue.
More fundamentally, there is a real political issue too. A lot of
people in the United States are public-domain publishers. A lot of
companies in the United States distribute all kinds of movies and
records and other products just because a foreign guy forgot to put
a "c" in a circle on it or forgot to renew the registration after twen-
ty-eight years. If you distributed a movie without a "c" in a circle,
under our old law it fell into the public domain. A lot of people
are making a lot of money by distributing these products.
The former Soviet Union is another issue. Although we don't
really have copyright protection for the Russians, there is an enor-
mous business in distributing scientific and technical literature that
came out of the Soviet Union in the United States. There's no
compensation for any of that. So potentially, it's a very politically
and economically charged issue. My fondest hope is that we will
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. "'he Congress shall have power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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be able to resolve it.
We have talked a great deal' about the Berne revision-the New
Instrument 16 -and other issues. I think that the resolution of those
issues internationally is probably three to five years away, and it is
going to take a long evolution. Sallie Weaver had asked a question
about performers in the United States. We have difficult domestic
issues to work out in the United States. We have difficult issues
to work out on performers' rights and the mechanical compulsory
licenses. Video rental rights raise issues that could put all of the
video rental shops out of business. Our house is not yet in order.
Right now, I don't see the dynamic between the United States
and the European Community, which is really the primary axis of
dissonance on this issue, to have evolved to the point where there
is enough of a vested interest on both of our sides to want to re-
solve the issue. Right now, the vested interest tends to be much
more on our side. Somehow, that is going to have to be changed.
A deal cut through the GATT, where there is that larger dynamic
at work, could make the whole exercise not irrelevant, but a lot
less urgent. In the alternative, do we somehow create a new dy-
namic whereby there is more at stake for both sides? Ultimately,
every negotiation is about both sides winning.
We have had a lot of success in negotiating intellectual proper-
ty agreements over the last several years. Many countries have
done much better in providing better laws and better enforcement.
We are often accused-at least I am often accused-of being this
mean thug that came and beat up on developing countries, forcing
them to do things against their will. Nobody in international nego-
tiations does things against their will. These countries have
changed their laws, in my opinion, largely because it is in their
self-interest, and many of them have benefited profoundly from
doing so.
16. Committee of Experts on a Possible Instrument for the Protection of the Rights
of Performers and Producers of Phonograms, 1st Sess., Questions Concerning Possible
Instrument for the Protection of the Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms,
Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau, WIPO Doc. INR/CE/I/2 (Mar. 12,
1993).
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